Consumer arbitrage affects international pricing in several ways. If all consumers face the same arbitrage costs, a monopolist's profit increases with arbitrage costs, and world welfare declines with them (if output does not rise). If arbitrage costs differ across consumers, a monopolist may sell in a second country even if there is no local demand-it can use the second country to discriminate across consumers in the first country. Again, world welfare typically falls with arbitrage costs. When there is also local demand in the second country, world welfare may be increasing in arbitrage costs, even if output falls.
Introduction
Transport costs have declined rapidly over the years, and many borders are now much more open than before, while the borders of the European Community are subject to almost no customs interference anymore. This means that it has become less costly to arbitrage across markets so that the ability for firms to price discriminate on a geographical basis is severely curtailed. Competitive analysis would suggest that world surplus should rise as arbitrage costs fall. Monopoly analysis of third-degree price discrimination leads to the same result (as long as output does not fall).
Third-degree price discrimination involves selling in different markets delineated by exogenous characteristics at different prices. Pure third-degree discrimination may be rather rare, since in many cases some consumers can arbitrage between markets, although at some cost. Europeans buy their PCs in the United States for use at home, Americans used to buy German cars in Europe, etc. The boundaries of the markets are often blurred and firms account for the fact that consumers can cross from one market segment to another, but at some cost. Since consumers in the high-price market can then choose which market to buy in, there is self-selection among them. This introduces an element of second-degree price discrimination: the firm chooses prices that anticipate an endogenous split of consumers.
An analysis of pure second-degree price discrimination has some independent interest, and has not so far been applied in the context of international trade. 1 We show that a monopolist may wish to create a second market in another country in which there is no focal demand for the product, in order to price discriminate across consumers in the first country. The analysis suggests that world welfare (and firm profit) rises as arbitrage costs fall.
We then integrate both second-and third-degree price discrimination within a common framework by analyzing monopoly pricing across countries when arbitrage PRICING WITH CONSUMER ARBITRAGE 127 is costly and there is local demand in the second country. A simple condition for profits to rise or fall with arbitrage costs depends on whether second-or third-degree discrimination is dominant. The analysis of pure second-and third-degree discrimination alone (described above) suggests that world welfare would fall with arbitrage costs. We find that, on the contrary, world welfare may increase if arbitrage is made more difficult.
The intuition for this result is as follows. The potential for third-degree price discrimination is curtailed when consumers in one country tend to buy in a second if the price there is low enough. However, the second country provides a channel for the monopolist to second-degree price discriminate among consumers from the first country if they can be sorted by arbitrage costs which are correlated with willingness to pay. In our model, higher arbitrage costs render second-degree price discrimination more effective. Hence profit rises with arbitrage costs if the third-degree effect dominates, and falls if the second-degree effect dominates. The welfare effects are also ambiguous. The most interesting case is when welfare improves in both countries. This can happen when higher arbitrage costs cause a large reduction in the number of consumers indulging in the (socially wasteful) operation of arbitrage. If the monopolist is based in the country from which consumers arbitrage, its profit may rise so much as to fully offset the decrease in consumer surplus there. Consumer surplus of residents in the other country also rises (the third-degree restraint having been relaxed), so that welfare rises in both countries. Hence the model provides an illustration of the proposition that higher nontariff barriers to trade may enhance the welfare of both countries involved.
This welfare result goes in the same direction as the one in Malueg and Schwartz (1994) who show that, if demand schedules in the various countries served by a monopolist are different enough, the possibility of parallel imports by unauthorized sellers may yield lower world welfare than third-degree price discrimination. The reason is that arbitrage forces the monopolist to set uniform prices across countries; prices may then be so high that the producer stops serving some countries, engendering a welfare loss if demands differ sufficiently.
2 In the Malueg-Schwartz model, there will be no parallel imports in equilibrium and the welfare gain from disallowing arbitrage stems from the fairly standard argument that more markets can be served under (thirddegree) price discrimination. In our model which includes an additional layer of second-degree discrimination, the reason for the welfare gain is that fewer resources are wasted on costly arbitrage activities, though these do not necessarily disappear in equilibrium.
In section 2, we set up the basic model. We then present two simple models of price discrimination in the presence of arbitrage costs. The first (section 3) is more familiar, and deals with third-degree discrimination. Second-degree discrimination is addressed in section 4. We then allow for both types together in section 5, while section 6 looks at a special case in order to establish the unexpected welfare result. Section 7 concludes the paper.
Preliminaries
Our research was motivated by the large price differences of cars across EC countries. Although these differences have declined somewhat over the last decade, they remain quite substantial, and this despite the 1985 European Commission regulations that stipulated that no producer can refuse to sell a car with the appropriate national specifications to a final consumer in another EC country.
3 .Hence consumer arbitrage would
